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I
O ne of Jean-Luc Nancy’s most character-istic philosophical gestures is to begin
by stressing – and thereby confirming – the dia-
lectical reciprocity or solidarity between
opposed values, in order then to affirm an
excessive third term, suitably redeemed or
reconfigured, of which it may then be
claimed, following what Derrida once called
Nancy’s “absolute, irredentist, post-decon-
structive realism” (Le Toucher 60; On Touch-
ing 46), that it undercuts or outstrips each
and every previous binary couple to which it
is properly (or improperly) irreducible. The
strategy, it is sometimes suggested, bears a
similarity to the classic three-stage speculative
dialectic. Its purpose is however quite different.
Rather than accrediting teleological pro-
gression, the ambition is rather to uncover an
origin that, having been hitherto obscured, is
yet to be grasped, and to expose or expound a
challenging new conceptual or, more accu-
rately, preconceptual self-evidence or
evidentiality.
In the prefatory “Coda” or tailpiece to a
recent collection of papers, assembled with
the help of Ginette Michaud, in which he exam-
ines the rivalry or dialogue between the literary
and the philosophical, each of which is said not
only to be in search of its own truth, but also,
and in all senses of the word, to be forever ques-
tioning the truth of the other, Nancy begins for
instance by underlining the opposed yet sym-
metrical characteristics of the two.1 So far, so
traditional. The point here, however, is not to
reinforce the stereotypical idea that the one
takes precedence over the other, or that the
one is but the continuation of the other by
alternative means, but rather to highlight the
“demande” – the title of Nancy’s book – ,
that is to say: “the asking, wanting, appealing,
beseeching, or frantic requiring” (Demande 9;
Expectation 1; trans. mod.), that the literary
and the philosophical each addresses to its
counterpart, but with no expectation that
either might deliver what its opposite number
craves. True, Nancy is quick to add, philosophy
and literature each have a different
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understanding of what they are seeking, which
necessarily lies beyond their purview, with phil-
osophy conceiving of truth as an “interruption
of sense,” and literature portraying truth as
“the impossibility of interrupting sense”
(Demande 10; Expectation 2), with the con-
trary and paradoxical rider that, while philos-
ophy cannot stop itself, devoted as it is to the
assimilation or incorporation of all that lies
outside it, so literature, condemned as it is to
the production of singular, discrete works,
only survives by cutting into its never-ending
flux.
The question of truth, Nancy insists, remains
unanswerable. Were there to be an answer, he
rightly argues, it would cause philosophy to
lapse into the authority of wisdom (or the
wisdom of authority) and literature into the fin-
ality of myth (or the myth of finality). “Philos-
ophy and Literature,” he explains, “are
Wisdom and Myth once they have entered the
time of asking, each having lost itself, or lost
the other” (Nancy, Demande 12; Expectation
3; trans. mod.). Loss, in other words, is
always already an unfolding, just as unfolding
is itself always already a loss. Paradox again
ensues, with wisdom (as in Socrates) ending
up unfolding the truth that there is no
wisdom, and myth (as in Joyce) unfolding its
finality by displaying its essential incompletion.
“Asking,” suggests Nancy, “has perhaps to
divide itself to make itself understood: from
philosophy to literature and from literature to
philosophy.” In which case, what remains, he
adds, appealing, as so often elsewhere, to the
elusive and indeterminate, yet perpetually
self-presenting, self-validating third term with
which his thinking has become synonymous,
is “simply the interminable coming of sense,
synonymous with its own asking” (Demande
13; Expectation 4; trans. mod.).
The argument is elegantly put. Symmetry
continues to rule. But this should not prevent
one from asking whether the narrative of loss
which Nancy unfolds does not itself beg a
number of obstinate questions. For it will be
remembered how he began his long career as
a philosopher and thinker by detecting in
Kant the overwhelming strength, or
incalculable weakness, of the undecidable, this
“sameness of the same [la mêmeté du même]
produced by the same [le même] as its altera-
tion.” Which was also to say: “the dialectic of
the Same, and therefore the dialectic itself, as
its own impossibility,” such that “perhaps the
least untenable statement,” he concluded, “is
along the lines of: the same undecides itself
[le même s’indécide]” (Nancy, Le Discours de
la syncope 13; The Discourse of the Syncope
9–10). If so, it would follow that the undecid-
able cannot ever be avoided by any philosophi-
cal discourse whatsoever, and the possibility
that it might continue to haunt Nancy’s own
discourse, as that discourse implies, should
not come as much of a surprise. Indeed, it is
one of the most properly and knowingly disrup-
tive aspects of Nancy’s thinking, and one that
programmes, so to speak, the many questions
– questions without answers – his work
bequeaths its readers.
But since “asking” is of the essence, one
cannot therefore not ask, according to the
story of loss or unfolding that Nancy tells,
that is, of loss as unfolding and unfolding as
loss, how it might still be possible, or not,
to tell the difference between, say, philosophy
and wisdom, or literature and myth, or even
between philosophy and literature “as such,”
in so far as what is most in doubt here, fol-
lowing Nancy’s reading of Kant, as Derrida
once put it, is the “as-such-ness” of the “as
such” “as such”? And if the one is forever
haunted by the hypothesis, threat, or would-
be truth of the other, and the other by the
one, how are we to decide which of the two,
in its interminable coming, is presenting
itself to us at all?
In the end, in a wilful, throwaway parting
gesture (“Let’s just all forget about ‘philos-
ophy, literature, myth, or wisdom,’” the
reader is enjoined), Nancy’s tailpiece abandons
such questions to their imponderable fate
(Demande 13; Expectation 4). The question
now, he maintains, is simply how to pass
beyond the fragile limit between the inter-
rupted and the uninterrupted, the complete
and the incomplete, and cross the uncertain
line between a conclusion and a suspension.
hill
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Passage alone, in other words, is what asks, and
passage alone is what is asked for. In only a few
choice pages, and five carefully worded frag-
ments or digressions, Nancy, then, takes his
reader from dialectical symmetry to wishful
transgression to self-confirming aporia, from
the one and the other, or the one or the other,
to the neither/nor or the in-between.
But how far is the in-between, or the passage
beyond, still indebted to the reciprocity it seeks
to overcome? The question, it may be remem-
bered, was the main burden of Maurice Blan-
chot’s discreet yet searching response to
Nancy’s in-between concept, excessive of
immanence and transcendence alike, of
“unworked” or “workless” “community,” and
the main reason for his principled reservations
regarding the very concept of “community.”2
For if it was the case that “workless commu-
nity,” on Nancy’s definition, based itself on a
dual rejection of collectivism and individual-
ism, i.e., both State communism and capitalist
neoliberalism, in so far as the one and the
other, in symmetrical and mutually complicit
fashion, each embodied the same equally unac-
ceptable figure of “immanentism,” it was by
virtue of a concept of dialectical reciprocity
that inevitably implied the prospect or tempta-
tion of their speculative overhaul. And this was
why, if some concept of “community” was
worth preserving, as Nancy would continue to
insist, a contention Blanchot was willing to
endorse only in so far as “community” was radi-
cally emptied of all positionality, thematicism,
and substantiality, then it was essential, in
Blanchot’s eyes, to dismantle the logic of reci-
procity itself rather than aim to pass beyond
it.3 It is however noticeable that, in none of
the many books, articles, or interviews Nancy
devotes to Blanchot’s writing, is this objection
ever explicitly recognised. Which would tend
to suggest that Nancy’s conceptual boldness
comes at a price, and that in his own thinking,
in much the same way as he shows it to be the
case with Kant, there is what one might call
an inescapable fragility, by dint of which, as
the logic of “asking” would also suggest, his
thinking is at its most provocative when it is
also at its most precarious. And vice versa.
If the word fragility seems appropriate here,
it is because, on Nancy’s own submission, as we
shall see, it is one of the possible names for the
neither/nor or the in-between. But before going
further, let me recall another piece by Nancy,
from the year 2000, also collected in
Demande, in which the symmetrical relation-
ship or opposition between “literature” and
“philosophy” is again recounted. It has as its
title a quotation and a parenthesis. The quota-
tion, from Hölderlin by way of Heidegger,
though neither author is mentioned by name,
uses a kind of French historic or mythic
present and reads: “Un jour, les dieux se retir-
ent… ,” “One day, the gods withdrew…”
(Nancy, Demande 37–44; Expectation 25–
30).4 The parenthesis states more simply, with
an oblique appeal to punctuation: “(Littéra-
ture/Philosophie: entre-deux)” [“Literature/
Philosophy: in-between”]. Here, then, as in
Nancy’s 2015 tailpiece, the task is to tell a
story, albeit one that, being no longer present
in itself, since it is a story about the eclipse of
presence, leaves in its wake two alternative pos-
sibilities, i.e., storytelling or truth, possibilities
which, in their separateness, each bear witness
to the same withdrawal of presence, the same
unavailability of the body of the gods. It is
the withdrawal of presence, in other words,
that provides for the separateness or the differ-
ence between what according to this tale of
origins will later become, on the one hand,
muthos, and, on the other, logos, otherwise
known as literature and philosophy.
Between the two, suggests Nancy, runs the
violence of a cut, a kind of disentanglement
that in its very possibility bears paradoxical
witness to that which cannot be disentangled,
told apart, or decided. At the same time, it is
this disentanglement that, separating truth
from narration, and narration from truth, insti-
tutes each as what it now is: literature, philos-
ophy. “Without that separation,” Nancy
argues, “there would be neither truth nor narra-
tion: there would be the body of god [or the
gods]” (Demande 39; Expectation 26; trans.
mod.).5 As far as these two offspring of the
gods are concerned, that is, as far as these two
descendants of the absence, or absent presence,
the fragility of thinking
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of the gods are concerned, rhetorical symmetry
again seems decisive. On either side of an
empty tomb, “a scene of mourning and
desire” comes to be staged: “philosophy, litera-
ture, each mourning and desiring the other (the
other as such, the other as same [l’autre
même]), but each also competing [rivalisant]
with the other in fulfilling mourning and
desire” (Demande 40; Expectation 27–28;
trans. mod.). “The absence of the gods,”
Nancy has it by way of conclusion,
is the condition of both, of both literature
and philosophy, the in-between that legiti-
mates the one and the other, both irreversi-
bly atheological. Together, however, they
are jointly charged with taking care
[prendre soin] of the in-between: with
keeping the body [le corps, i.e., the body of
god or the gods] open, allowing it the
chance of that opening. (Demande 41;
Expectation 28; trans. mod.)
Inevitable tautology aside, Nancy’s fable of
the withdrawal of the gods and the arrival on
the scene of the philosophical and the literary
as adversaries and accomplices is both sugges-
tive and economical. It remains however a
story, one that, according to Nancy’s own pres-
entation, is necessarily in search of its elusive
truth. Indeed, one learns,
not only is narration liable to be found
lacking in truth or suspected of being so, it
is indeed deprived of it from the outset,
being deprived of the present body as the
mouth of its own utterance, the skin of its
own exposure. (Demande 39; Expectation
27; trans. mod.)
If so, Nancy’s own writing, notwithstanding its
fondness for rhetorical symmetry, cannot do
other than exhibit an underlying asymmetry
which is in equal measure both enabling and
disabling. For in order to account for the separ-
ation between philosophy and literature, and so
as to posit the absent body of the divine as their
secret or secretly shared condition, and even as
his discourse offers itself to its readers as
belonging primarily not to fiction but to
thought, so Nancy, as in the case of all founding
myths or myths of foundation, and in what is
also plainly a calculated move, is constrained
to tell a story, present a fable, or reinvent a
myth. Which cannot but leave undecided, and
perpetually undecidable, the question of the
status of Nancy’s own presentation: is it best
seen as a kind of philosophy, or as a kind of lit-
erature, or perhaps more accurately as neither,
that is to say, as a sophisticated attempt to reach
back, in word or gesture, towards the absent
presence of the body of god or of the gods?
Which would of course explain his decision,
amply documented in later work, to attempt
to deconstruct Christianity, always at the risk
of falling into the trap, encountered by many
others in the past, of reconstructing it.
No doubt, since such is the logic of all
“asking,” such questions are unlikely to be
answerable in one way or in another. In any
case, Nancy’s own writing, as readers will be
aware, is in its own terms remarkably diverse:
there are numerous examples of formal philoso-
phical analysis, rigorous ontological inquiry, or
historical or theological commentary. There are
translations, poems, fictional or autobiographi-
cal writings, interventions responding to urgent
political events, probing accounts of literary
outputs, exhibitions, artistic installations,
films and stage productions. There are many
responses to invitations, texts written in the
form of fragments, extemporary interviews,
and numerous cases of collaboration with
others, with thinkers, writers, artists of all
kinds.
It is to a relatively well-known example of
this last category that, briefly, I now turn. It
again appears or, better, reappears, by now
for at least the third time, in Nancy’s 2015 col-
lection. Its significance has both to do with what
it argues and the way it chooses to do so. Titled
“Noli me frangere,” i.e., “Break Me Not,” it
was first published in 1982, jointly authored
by Nancy and his long-term collaborator Phi-
lippe Lacoue-Labarthe, following on from the
pair’s anthology and analysis of texts by the
Jena Romantics, L’Absolu littéraire (The Lit-
erary Absolute) of 1978. Prompted in part,
the authors explain, by a section of Blanchot’s
1980 volume of fragmentary writing, L’Écriture
du désastre (The Writing of the Disaster), the
hill
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principal focus of the paper is the question of
the status of the literary fragment in Romanti-
cism and literary modernity. Nancy and
Lacoue-Labarthe’s discussion is not however
in any standard form of literary or philosophi-
cal exposition. Taking its cue from Friedrich
Schlegel’s “Gespräch über die Poesie” (“Dia-
logue on Poetry”), it begins as a sequence
of unattributed fragments, then turns into a
brief dialogue between two voices (which con-
vention suggests one should identify with the
two authors), followed by a lengthy section in
which the two take on the names and roles of
the interlocutors from Schlegel’s 1800 dia-
logue, i.e., Ludovico (presumably JLN) and
Lothario (presumably PhLL), after which
there is a further brief exchange between the
two. Taken as a whole, so to speak, the
piece, at one and the same time, displays
and interrogates that cleverly self-conscious,
half-serious, half-ironic Witz, much prized
by the Romantics, that Nancy discusses in
an earlier, 1977 essay, also contained in
Demande, where it appears immediately
after the inaugural Coda under the title: “A
Kind of Prologue: menstruum universale,”
and explores what Novalis once described as
the phenomenon of “literary dissolution.”
Once again, as in the case of numerous other
inherited and inescapably metaphysical binary
oppositions – literature and philosophy,
muthos and logos, the religious and the
secular, monotheism and atheism, myth and
demythologisation, even the immanent and
the transcendent – , the first task Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy give themselves is to
emphasise, and reinforce, the dialectical soli-
darity of a thinking of the work and a thinking
of the fragment. Each in fact, it is quickly
suggested, despite appearances to the contrary,
is but the mirror image or photographic nega-
tive of the other. All works, it would appear,
are always already fragments, and all fragments
works. “Dialectics, i.e., discourse,” it follows
(Blanchot had argued much the same in L’Écri-
ture du désastre), “is indestructible.” And this
is duly one of the meanings of the title of
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s text: “Noli me
frangere, commands the dialectic in every
text, both in the fragmentary text as well, and
in any discourse in fragments on the fragment.
Break me not, fragment me not” (Demande
196; Expectation 132; trans. mod.).
But at the very moment when it would
appear that all thinking of the work or the frag-
ment is destined to be trapped in a vicious
circle from which there is no way out, the dia-
lectic having always already determined and
appropriated all available alternatives, Nancy,
or his partner, advances the word “fragility”
to address that which, being neither the work
nor the fragment, is not only irreducible to
each, but, just like the absent presence of god
or the gods, is also the joint, in-between con-
dition of possibility of both. And it is a con-
dition of possibility that is itself
indestructible, not least because it precedes
both the fragment (which, being always
already fragmented, cannot properly be now
what it purports to be), and the whole (which
is likewise anything but what it claims). And
being “indestructible,” one learns, “fragility,”
underlined in the text, “is more tenuous, more
trembling, more unbearable than any fragmen-
tation” – while also, in acknowledging no oppo-
sition, being thereby insuperable, not to say
omnipotent. Fragility at any event, write
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, is what there is
in beginning to speak or to write. In opening
one’s mouth, or inscribing a word. There, or
then, is when it breaks – nowhere else, and at
no other time. The fragility of a glorious
body (neither transcendent nor immanent,
neither yours nor mine, neither body nor
soul) breaks a throat or a hand. Thus arises
a word, a discourse, a song, a writing. The
glorious body will never stop repeating this
command, as fragile as an entreaty: Noli
me frangere. (Demande 197–98; Expec-
tation 133; trans. mod.)
In the title of Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s
text – “Noli me frangere” – , two different, con-
trasting, even opposed meanings compete,
then, for attention. On the one hand, “break
me not” are the words uttered by the dialectic,
by the discourse of philosophy in general,
which, from the summit of its authority, tells
us that what literary history has hitherto
the fragility of thinking
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called the fragment, i.e., that of the Romantics,
of Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, and so many
others, and that of modernity, of Nietzsche,
Kafka, Artaud, or Beckett – is impossible.
“Break me not, fragment me not,” we are
told, because, however much we try, we will
have failed, not least by trying to try, since to
will fragmentation is always already to subordi-
nate the fragment to the energy or the will,
which is to say, to the desire for a work. On
the other hand, “break me not” are (almost)
the words pronounced by a glorious body,
warning a human, all too human hand to
refrain from retaining or capturing it. The
scene alluded to here, taken from the Gospel
according to John 20.17, is of course well
known. In what follows, Nancy, in the guise
of “Ludovico,” glosses it more fully by remind-
ing readers how, after the crucifixion, after
Christ’s body has been laid out for burial,
Mary Magdalene goes to the empty sepulchre,
and, seeing a man she takes to be a mere gar-
dener, fails to recognise who it is. “Jesus,
however, calls out to her: ‘Mary!’ Turning on
her heels, she replies with the word:
‘Rabboni!,’ in Hebrew, meaning ‘Master!,’”
i.e., Magister, according to the Latin Vulgate
text that Nancy, for reasons he explains else-
where (in La Déclosion 142n2; Dis-Enclosure
183n19), is here closely following. And Jesus
goes on, with now proverbial words: “Noli me
tangere,” “Touch me not, for I am not yet
ascended to my Father” (Nancy, Demande
204; Expectation 138; trans. mod.).
Two versions, two readings, two opposing
interpretations of “mastery” seem to be at
stake here. Both imply the imminence, that
is, both the threat and the promise of an
ascent, of a dialectical raising of one thing
into its other, here the fragment into the
work, there the mortal body into evidence of
its inalienable immortality. And in both cases,
“Noli me frangere” or “Noli me tangere”
enacts a prohibition, an injunction instructing
us as to what is not possible, or at least not
desirable, not worth wanting or willing: not
possible, it would appear, to write according
to the fragment, and similarly not possible to
retain the transcendent. And yet, here as well
as there, is something – though, in truth, it is
barely a thing at all – fragile and yet indestruc-
tible, which is to say, fragility “as such”
(though one can but tremble at the idea of
using the expression here, since fragility is pre-
cisely what dissolves any “as such” “as such”),
or, equally well, the glorious body which, being
neither immanent nor transcendent, eludes all
apprehension.
There is of course at least a third function of
the phrase “Noli me frangere.” For it should
not be forgotten it is also the title of a singular
piece of writing, jointly signed by Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, which,
in its playfulness, its tongue-in-cheek irony,
its allusiveness, and heterogeneous composition
(fragment, dialogue, pastiche, etc.), is already
an egregious example of that Romantic Witz
explored by Nancy in the 1977 paper that
serves his 2015 book as “A Kind of Prologue.”
“Witz,” Nancy had explained,
barely belongs to literature or does so, as it
were, only just, and only by the back door,
or in a roundabout way; it is neither a
genre nor a style, nor even a figure of rheto-
ric. But nor does it belong to philosophy, not
being a concept, judgement, or argument.
And yet it has the capacity to assume all
these roles, but only in an act of derision.
(Demande 15; Expectation 8; trans. mod.)
This, then, “in a certain sense,” he adds,
is the lesson of the Witz: the uncontrolled –
and uncontrollable – genesis of the blurring
of genres, or what one might be tempted to
call the “genre of the West,” literature and
philosophy, neither literature nor philos-
ophy, literature or philosophy. In a word, lit-
erary dissolution – where “literary” solely
means the realm of the letter and of
writing in general, the scriptural West.
(Demande 22–23; Expectation 13; trans.
mod.)
In its French guise, as “esprit” (meaning
“spirit” and “wit”), or as English “wit,”
suggests Nancy, Witz “is the specific modern
product of the philosophical crisis of judge-
ment,” which itself is but “the modern resta-
ging of a ‘crisis’ constitutive of all
hill
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philosophical discourse,” and “thus marks the
element or structure of undecidability in all
‘logical’ decision-making itself” (Demande 23;
Expectation 13–14; trans. mod.). If, on the
one hand, then, “Witz may be said to be
nothing other than the dialectical thought of
identity, beginning with the thought of the
self-identity of ‘wit’ itself,” such that “the sep-
aration and total opposition between Witz and
Reason only ever occurs so as to allow that dia-
lectic to function,” and has only ever “opposed
literature to philosophy the better to maintain
mastery over their divide,” so, on the other, it
appears that “outside philosophy, outside lit-
erature (outside of psychoanalysis too),
outside the mixture or coupling of the two (or
the three), Witz neither delivers nor releases
anything” (Demande 28, 32; Expectation 17–
18, 21; trans. mod.).
This witzig, “witty,” or “spiritual” re-presen-
tation of its two contradictory earlier instances of
indisputable mastery – of the dialectic and of the
risen Christ – has, it would appear, at least two
corollaries. First, it fragilises, by derision, so to
speak, or by outplaying it, the two friends’ dia-
logue as a fragmentary discourse on the frag-
ment (this, the reader is told, is what should
be avoided at all costs). In that sense, it draws
it in the direction of what no longer belongs
either to philosophy or to literature, but
resides in their semi-serious, semi-laughable in-
between. It endeavours, in other words, to
outwit – or, more properly, to out-Witz – the dia-
lectic in the name of that fragile, glorious body
that has been brought forth, leaving their pres-
entation to plummet, as it were, into the
depths of an abyss. Not for nothing does one
of the pair – Lacoue-Labarthe, one may guess –
joyfully exclaim: “let us dance, then, on the
edge of the abyss” (Nancy, Demande 199;
Expectation 134; trans. mod.), an abyss, it
would seem, whose principal task is to contest
the spectre of dialectical mastery.
But this, as always, is only one part of the
story. For at the same time, in attempting to
outwit or out-Witz the dialectic, as Nancy’s
commentary on the Witz duly explains, what
Witz does is not to force the dialectic to
unravel, but rather to strengthen it, in so far
as it is itself already but an exemplification of
“the dialectical thought of identity.” Even as
the fragility of a glorious body seems to inter-
rupt the dialectic, so in return the dialectic
duly takes possession of that selfsame fragility
of the glorious body. The rising of the one
turns imperceptibly into the raising of the
other. Weakness becomes strength, fragility
the indestructible, the immanent the transcen-
dent. And if this is what they all are in the
end, it is surely because that is what they
already were in the beginning.
What remains, however, in so far as “Witz,”
according to Nancy, “neither delivers nor
releases anything,” is a kind of performative
gesture – indeed what could be more expan-
sively performative than Nancy’s and Lacoue-
Labarthe’s Romantic dialogue? – one which,
as its closing words make clear, is both incon-
clusive and interminable.
So where, then, it might be asked, does this
leave the attempt, desire, or will, if that is
what it is, to break the closure of the dialectic,
break free from its strictures, and break out
into the open? As I’ve tried to show, following
in Nancy’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s footsteps,
as their 1982 title already had it, the enterprise
is an impossible one.
But if so, there still remains a chance – a
caesura, or perhaps just a syncope – which is
none other than the possibility of that impossi-
bility. There is, in other words, in writing itself,
in the dialectic, even, a fracture or fissure, a fragi-
lity, so to speak, that allows thinking – and think-
ing with Nancy – to continue at all. It is this no
doubt that Nancy has in mind when he speaks
of “the interminable coming of sense, synon-
ymous with its own asking.” And this is also
why it is to that possibility of an impossibility,
and to the impossibility of that possibility, that
Nancy comes to devote much of his thinking. It
is however essential to remember that “sense,”
on Nancy’s idiosyncratic definition, is never
given “as such.” “Sense [le sens],” he writes,
defies all completion. At every stage, one
thinks one is positing a meaning [poser une
signification]: sense deposes them all [le
sens les dépose toutes] and despatches
the fragility of thinking
48
them elsewhere, towards an outside that is
both before and after. Patiently, frantically,
this elsewhere inscribes, exscribes its
traces. (Nancy, Demande 86; Expectation
62; trans. mod.)
Its impossible possibility, then, remains vulner-
able and exposed: imponderable, undecidable,
and perilously fragile.
Let me cite here an example, which, natu-
rally enough, is anything but an example.
Much of Nancy’s earlier work, it may be
recalled, following on from his engagement
with German Romanticism, is given over to
the question of myth. Myth, being tautegorical
rather than allegorical, as Nancy never tires
telling his readers, quoting time and again a
famous passage from Schelling, itself based on
a remark by Coleridge pertaining to the
Gospels, is that which always already contains
its own interpretation, its own explanation, its
own commentary. It has no outside that is not
always already another version of itself
(Nancy, La Communauté désœuvrée 124–25;
The Inoperative Community 49; trans.
mod.).6 But if so, Schelling, and Nancy too, if
only for a fragile, flickering moment (it is of
course the moment of “sense”), must neverthe-
less have the possibility of stepping beyond
myth in order to describe it in these very
terms. Myth, in other words, like time, like
history, necessarily incorporates its own inter-
ruption, without which it would not be grasp-
able at all. Whence the fundamental question
that occupies much of Nancy’s thinking about
myth: is the interruption of myth merely a dia-
lectical continuation of myth by other means,
or is it an epochal caesura or syncope which
makes it possible to set myth aside?
To this abiding question, Nancy gives,
however, perhaps unavoidably inconsistent
answers. Particularly revealing is his shifting
account of the emblematic figure of Blanchot,
whose writings, both fictional texts and critical
essays, occupy a central, if discreet role in the
overall composition of Demande. Before going
further however, it is worth recalling a
passage which does not feature in the collection,
but in Nancy’s 1986 volume, La Communauté
désœuvrée (The Inoperative Community),
itself written in partial response to Blanchot’s
La Communauté inavouable. Glossing the
expression Blanchot takes as his title, explicitly
borrowed from Bataille (and subsequently
from Derrida),7 as many commentators, includ-
ing Nancy, seemingly fail to observe, Nancy
asks:
Does the unavowable have a myth? By defi-
nition, it does not. The absence of avowal
amounts neither to a manner of speaking
[une parole] nor to the telling of a story
[un récit]. But if community is inseparable
from myth, must there not be, by paradoxi-
cal necessity, a myth of unavowable
community?
To which he provides this unambiguous, deci-
sive answer: “This is however impossible.”
Nancy then adds: “It bears repeating: unavow-
able community, the withdrawal of communion
or communitarian ecstacy, are revealed in the
interruption of myth. And the interruption is
not a myth” (La Communauté désœuvrée 147;
The Inoperative Community 58; trans. mod.).
In 2014, however, revisiting these same ques-
tions apropos of the very same text by Blan-
chot, Nancy chooses to argue the opposite,
now insisting that the expression “unavowable
community” is a tell-tale symptom of regressive
nostalgia for mythic communion, linked “not
necessarily to fascism, far from it,” as Nancy
rather coyly puts it, echoing a widespread but
unsubstantiated rumour regarding Blanchot’s
political past, but nonetheless “most certainly
to right-wing thinking.” “The avowal of the
unavowable,” he now claimed, “is the avowal
of a recourse to myth.” “Such recourse,” he
added,
also means that Blanchot’s thinking on lit-
erature and on community are more than
just closely interconnected: perhaps they
should be viewed as essentially the same, if
indeed there is no literary communication
[according to Blanchot] other than in the
register of myth […] and no thought of the
common (of community or sharing)
without recourse to that register.8 (Nancy,
La Communauté désavouée 134; The Dis-
avowed Community 62; trans. mod.)
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Here then, the unavowable (and its so-called
“avowal”), myth, literature, and community
in Blanchot are explicitly aligned as exhibit-
ing a single continuous thought, in a way
specifically excluded in 1986, suggesting
that Nancy in 1986 somehow got matters
badly wrong – unless of course it is in
2014, conversely, that he loses sight of what
he had expressed so trenchantly nearly
thirty years earlier.
True enough, major thinkers are no more
immune than others to fatal misprisions, wild
assertions, false conclusions, or palinodic con-
versions. Philosophers too make mistakes,
have second thoughts, or come to see matters
differently, and there is little doubt that, just
like others, they should be allowed to change
their minds. This however does not necessarily
imply that with maturity of age comes a firmer
grasp on the truth or that relative youth be seen
as an impediment to wisdom. There are, as one
knows, many instances of the opposite. At any
event, Nancy’s change of mind is remarkable,
as is the decisiveness with which, in 1986 and
2014, he felt able to put forward what are, in
retrospect, two diametrically opposed interpret-
ations of Blanchot’s reliance or non-reliance on
foundational myth. There is nothing however
gratuitous in any such shift. For the prior con-
dition for Nancy’s contradictory pronounce-
ments, both the readings they embody and
the self-certainty with which they are delivered,
paradoxically enough, is the abiding and ines-
capable undecidability which makes all
decisions both possible and necessary from
the outset, and yet, as numerous sleepless
nights bear witness, inevitably precarious and
fragile.
In 2015, in conversation with Mathilde
Girard, reviewing the question of myth and
its outside, Nancy, with admirable frankness,
acknowledged as much. “The expression ‘inter-
rupted myth’ I used in La Communauté
désœuvrée,” he told his interviewer, “was not
challenged by Philippe [Lacoue-Labarthe],
quite the opposite, it seems to me, but neither
he nor I knew exactly how it should be under-
stood. And I still do not know” (Girard and
Nancy 53).
II
Given the profound turbulence and abiding
indecision associated with the name Blanchot
in Nancy’s writing, it was to be expected that
it should feature as a recurrent, if intermittent
point of reference in several of the diverse
essays, dating from 1977 to 2013, brought
together in Demande under the heading of “lit-
erature.” Blanchot’s texts, Nancy writes, in one
of the earliest of these essays, together with the
works of Mallarmé, Proust, Joyce, Kafka,
Bataille, Borges, and Laporte, are among
those which “today,” i.e., in 1977, are impos-
sible to ignore (“incontournables”), and mark
an obligatory point of passage in which it was
imperative steadfastly to “remain” (Demande
45; Expectation 31–32). True, this early en-
dorsement of Blanchot’s writing rarely leads
to more than a series of fleeting allusions on
Nancy’s part to signature words or phrases bor-
rowed from Blanchot, including terms or topics
such as work (“œuvre”) or worklessness
(“désœuvrement”), the apocalypse, the “imme-
morial” past, or “the terrifyingly ancien” (“l’ef-
froyablement ancien”). More importantly,
however, now under the heading of “Sense”
(“Sens”), Demande also contains three further
texts devoted to Blanchot. The first, “Noli me
frangere,” co-authored with Lacoue-Labarthe,
and arising from a discussion of Blanchot’s
L’Écriture du désastre, as seen earlier, is
chiefly concerned with the question of the frag-
ment and with the fragility said to precede it.
The two remaining texts are more explicitly in
the form of detailed commentaries on motifs
in Blanchot’s writing, “Résurrection de Blan-
chot [Blanchot’s Resurrection],” from 2004,
and “Le Neutre, la neutralisation du neutre
[The Neuter and the Neutralisation of the
Neuter],” first published in 2011 (Nancy,
Demande 253–70; Expectation 177–90).9
Within the overall structure of Nancy’s
Demande, there is however something odd,
even anomalous about the inclusion of these
two later essays. In his prefatory “Coda,”
Nancy makes the valid point that solely those
texts “that relate to literature” were selected
for the volume, which meant leaving out
the fragility of thinking
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many other, occasional studies devoted to the
analysis of “specific works” (Demande 13;
Expectation 4), such as those by Jean-Chris-
tophe Bailly, Michel Deguy, Lacoue-Labarthe,
Laporte, Shakespeare, or others, not to
mention essays readily available elsewhere on,
say, Flaubert, Edmond Jabès, or Michel
Leiris.10 Why then include two essays dealing
quite explicitly, and in some detail, with par-
ticular aspects of Blanchot’s work? The most
likely answer is that, in addressing specific
textual passages occurring in Blanchot’s inau-
gural novel, Thomas l’Obscur (Thomas the
Obscure, 1941) and in his post-1968 volume of
fragmentary writing, Le Pas au-delà (The
Step Not Beyond, 1973), Nancy was also con-
scious of using Blanchot’s writing, albeit
indirectly, in order to reflect (and reflect on)
aspects of his own thinking. Prominent
among Nancy’s concerns from 1995, it will be
remembered, and in particular during the
early years of the new century, coinciding
with his return to Blanchot, was his project
for the “deconstruction of Christianity,” in
which the work of Blanchot would play a not
insignificant role as symptom and illustration,
so much so that “Résurrection de Blanchot,”
together with an essay on “Le Nom de Dieu
chez Blanchot [The Name God in Blanchot],”
initially served as a centrepiece in Nancy’s
2005 La Déclosion (Déconstruction du christia-
nisme, I) [Dis-Enclosure, the Deconstruction of
Christianity].
In turn, in much the same way as the ques-
tion of the interruption of myth had done two
decades earlier, so the deconstruction of Chris-
tianity, as Derrida was often heard to remark,
posed in acute form the question of its own
possibility, not least the availability of some
Archimedean lever simultaneously outside
and inside Christianity, at once integral to it
yet inassimilable by it, from which to undertake
the task of deconstruction. That this should
entail renewed scrutiny of the limits or inner
or outer margins of the Hegelian dialectic was
something of which Nancy and Blanchot were
both intensely aware, and it is telling that in
his 2011 essay on Blanchot it should be in
close, and potentially dangerous proximity to
Hegel (following, it is true, an indication of
Blanchot’s own) that Nancy should choose to
locate the thought of the neuter. Also worth
noting, and continuing to rumble on from the
mid-1980s, was the memory of unfinished
business between the pair on the subject of
“community,” with Nancy underlining in
2001 the extent to which he still felt La Commu-
nauté inavouable of 1983, as far as his own La
Communauté désœuvrée was concerned, to be
“simultaneously an echo, a resonance and a
rejoinder, a reservation, or even in some
respects a reproach” (La Communauté
affrontée 38; “The Confronted Community”
40; trans. mod.).
In each of these diverse instances, it is
readily apparent that the work of Blanchot,
with which Nancy in 1977 deemed it essential
to pause, and to which he indeed returns time
and again in almost obsessive fashion, contin-
ued to function as a provocative reference
point, an example of what to follow or what to
avoid, even at times as a convenient lightning
rod for some of the difficulties and ambiguities
of his own thinking. That another author or
thinker should in this way become a kind of
secret sharer existing within or without one’s
own thinking, it may be said, is far from
unusual. Indeed, such haunting of one body
of work by another is intimately connected
with the process of thinking itself, which is
also in the form of an asking and an answering
in dialogue both with the living and with the
dead.
It was in that regard only logical that, in his
2004 paper, “Blanchot’s Resurrection,” pre-
sented as part of a series of public lectures
delivered less than a year after Blanchot’s
death at the age of ninety-five, the topic
Nancy should choose to address was precisely
the question of living and dying. As the point
of departure and main focus of his talk,
Nancy took a brief, relatively little-known
passage from Thomas l’Obscur in which one
encounters the following sentence: “He
walked on, the only veritable Lazarus [seul
Lazare véritable] whose very death was resusci-
tated [ressuscitée]” (49).11 While the grammati-
cal subject of the sentence, as Nancy points out,
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is unambiguously Blanchot’s protagonist, i.e.,
Thomas, it is readily apparent that the burden
of Blanchot’s formulation, as persistently else-
where in the novel, is to put into doubt any
notion that a subject might own his or her
experience, or that experience be anything
other than an abyssal absence of foundation.
It is in this respect far from coincidental that,
according to Jacobus da Varagine (or Vora-
gine), author of the thirteenth-century Golden
Legend, the name Thomas should signify
“abyss” or “twin” (de Voragine I: 57).
Was this idiosyncratic reference to the New
Testament, Nancy asks, evidence of a lingering
commitment to Catholicism, as he would
increasingly claim, in so far as Blanchot here
was thought to want to “preserve, at least in
part, the monotheistic, or more precisely Chris-
tian roots of the thought of resurrection”
(Demande 254; Expectation 178; trans.
mod.)? Or did Blanchot’s attempted “rewriting
of Holy Scripture” (Demande 263; Expectation
184) already announce something of what
Nancy had come to call the “deconstruction”
of Christianity? Or if it did something of the
latter, did it not do so at the risk of clinging
to the former, and reflect a fundamental
tension, not to say an inescapable fragility inse-
parable from thought itself? Such, at any event,
according to Nancy, was the “danger” it was
necessary to avoid, and it comes as no surprise,
notwithstanding Nancy’s Socratic questioning
of Blanchot’s text, that this should also be the
trap into which Nancy, in his own efforts to
deconstruct Christianity, is himself sometimes
thought to fall, not least by Blanchot
himself.12 Which might suggest that the conse-
quences of the abiding fragility of thinking are
less easily averted than is sometimes claimed,
and have the unerring capacity of displaying
themselves in places where, and at times
when, they are least expected.
Nancy begins his reading of Blanchot’s sen-
tence by observing, rightly enough, that the res-
urrection of Thomas’s death is anything but a
resurrection of Thomas dead, since it substi-
tutes for the dialectical passage from death to
life, as understood in Christian, not to say
Hegelian doctrine, a much more fragile
exposure to the experience or, better, the non-
experience of life in death and death in life,
i.e., the radical inaccessibility of the experience
of dying and, by that token, of living itself, irre-
ducibly defiant of all presence. (“Inner experi-
ence” in Bataille, it will be remembered, was
similarly for Blanchot “experience of non-
experience” (L’Entretien infini 311; The Infi-
nite Conversation 210).) At the same time,
even as he makes this argument, Nancy still
allows himself, by sleight of hand, by attribut-
ing to Blanchot, as though they were a state-
ment of critical or aesthetic principle,
comments made in 1953 apropos of Rilke,
whose poetic experience, one knows, was very
different to that of Blanchot, in order to subor-
dinate the motif of “death resuscitated” in
Blanchot (much as Nancy would subsequently
do with the non-concept of “unavowable com-
munity”) to a still lingering concept of the
artwork, albeit of “the artwork in its essential
worklessness [de l’œuvre en son désœuvrement
essentiel]” (Demande 253–54; Expectation
178; trans. mod.).13 The formulation, as has
been pointed out, owes more to Blanchot’s at
times severe critical assessment of the thinking
of the Jena Romantics14 than to any of his own
fragmentary writings. It is nevertheless striking
that Nancy, two pages later, citing the same
Romantic notion of the immanence of the
artwork, still felt able to suggest how, for Blan-
chot’s Lazarus, unlike the Lazarus of the
Gospels,
truth does not consist in any such return
[from death to life]: it resides in the conco-
mitance of death and of a life within death
that does not revert to life, but vivifies
[fait vivre] death as such [en tant que
telle]. In other words, the true Lazarus [le
vrai Lazare: Nancy’s gloss substitutes
“true” for “veritable” in Blanchot] lives his
dying [vit son mourir] just as he dies his
living [meurt son vivre]. (Demande 256;
Expectation 179–80; trans. mod.)
Nancy’s formula is not without its aphoristic
force. Rather surprisingly, however, it omits to
take account of that indisputable fragility of
living and dying in Blanchot, as a result of
the fragility of thinking
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which neither the one nor the other is ever
accessible “as such,” and never available to be
signified, even by an artwork, in its supposed
self-identity. This in turn cannot do other
than cast an aura of troubling fragility over
the sternly reductive definition of “literature”
with which Nancy’s paper concludes, “litera-
ture,” that is, as Nancy puts it, as that which,
embodied in the logic of the work with which
he precipitately identifies Blanchot’s thinking,
“writes only the present of what has always
already happened to us, that is, the impossible
into which our being consists in disappearing”
(Demande 256; Expectation 185; trans. mod.).
What one misses most of all in such a defi-
nition, which also might seem to contradict
much of what is argued elsewhere in
Demande, is any awareness of the conjectural
uncertainty of any such decisive judgement
and what one might rightly call its fragility, as
though Nancy’s own concept of fragility was
in the end, for some reason, not fragile
enough, and only able to reach so far and no
further. “Literature,” Blanchot once replied to
a questionnaire in 1992, “is a potency [puis-
sance] that takes account of nothing.” He
then added: “But when is there literature?”
(Blanchot, La Condition critique 465). Litera-
ture, in other words, as at least some of the
texts collected in Demande appear to agree, is
inseparable from a radical questioning, an
asking rather than an answering, and to that
extent, as Blanchot’s comment suggests, it
arises only when it comes from the outside,
and belongs, not to the “present,” but only to
the in-between or neither/nor.
But how to respond to what falls between
positions, how to give it a name, and how to
make its voice heard? How, then, to understand
the fragile interruption of myth, power, and
presence, with which “literature” is said to be
synonymous? And with what words to affirm
the withdrawal and absence of the god or gods?
In an effort, if not to provide an answer, then
at least to prolong the demands made by such
questions, Nancy in 2011 immediately chose
to construe Blanchot’s use of the non-concept
of the neuter, this fragile trace synonymous
only with its withdrawal, elision, or erasure, as
a response to the death of “God,” this
“surplus word,” or “word too many,” as Blan-
chot had put it in Le Pas au-delà, and which
had somehow been allowed to “rise above
language by taking control of it, perhaps by
breaking it apart, at the very least by claiming
to set a limit to it” (Le Pas au-delà 84–85;
The Step Not Beyond 59–60; trans. mod.).
Nancy follows up his remark by suggesting
however that, in so far as it too, according to
an earlier text by Blanchot (albeit in a very
different sense), was a “word too many,” so
the word “neuter” in Blanchot enjoyed similar
status as that of “God.” In which case, it
would be just another instance of a dubious
master concept destined to foreclose any
futural “sense.” It is true, as Nancy points
out, that Blanchot in Le Pas au-delà draws
attention to the possible parallels between the
“neuter” and Hegelian Aufhebung, not least,
of course, to stress that the neuter was radically
irreducible to Hegelian negativity, to being and
to non-being alike, and only “evoked” the
“movement” of Aufhebung from a suspensive
and interruptive distance, without producing
any dialectical result, be it in the form of an
artwork or of some superior concept (Le
Pas au-delà 101–07; The Step Not Beyond
72–76).
Nancy in 2011 seems however to have been
less than convinced, and only too keen, in
responding to the challenge of thinking the
“in-between” of “sense,” to resist the tempta-
tion or, better, to exorcise the threat of the
covert reliance on speculative dialectics he sus-
pects, impatiently, to be at work in Blanchot.
But if the neuter, according to Nancy’s 2011
presentation, runs the risk of too great a proxi-
mity to Hegelian dialectics, it seems elsewhere
that the opposite is equally true. In La Commu-
nauté désavouée, for instance, Nancy dismisses
Blanchot’s commitment to the neuter as a mere
“Romantico-Idealist” vestige, “more reminis-
cent of the negative theology of Nicolas de
Cusa,” far removed from the “tragic” rewriting
of Hegel by Bataille (La Communauté
désavouée 40, 84; The Disavowed Community
15, 35). What, in other words, seems to irk
Nancy in Blanchot’s thinking – and the
hill
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objection is self-evidently paradoxical – is the
ineradicable fragility of the neuter invoked for
instance in a passage from L’Entretien infini
partially quoted, but hastily interrupted by
Nancy, in which one reads:
The neuter: this word too many that sub-
tracts itself [Nancy breaks off at this point
in order to privilege negativity over dissemi-
nation] either by reserving for itself a place
from which it is always missing while
leaving a trace, or by provoking a displace-
ment without place, or else by distributing
itself, in multiple fashion, in a supplement
of place. (L’Entretien infini 458; The Infi-
nite Conversation 312–13)
Which was also to say that, for Blanchot, the
neuter, this name without name for the always
other word, the word always too few and
always too many, was not only the condition
of possibility of all literature, but also the
reason for literature’s radical fragility, or, in
other words, its insuperable force and immea-
surable weakness, as always other than what it
is, or is not.
It is no doubt the task of philosophy, in its
pursuit of truth, to assert authority over the
unruliness to which literature bears witness,
just as it is the business of literature to set phil-
osophy aside and ignore its would-be foun-
dations. If so, between the two, the
undecidability of a relation without relation
remains ineliminable. And if thinking is to
remain possible at all, Nancy tells us, it is
only in so far as it allows itself to affirm the fra-
gility on which it relies, and which constantly
traverses, and forcibly outlives it.
echo by jean-luc nancy
I thank Leslie Hill for his precise and valued
attention to my fragilities. He is right to be so
concerned about what inevitably makes
thought come short in relation to what it
thinks. It seems to me that in Blanchot there
is such a recurring shortcoming, not in what
he seeks to preserve – the elusiveness (l’insai-
sissable) of what is essential, the impossibility
of having a “last word” – but in the fact that
in the end he himself grasps this elusiveness
and presents it. This movement is not always
present or visible, but is in any case what
drives The Unavowable Community. It is a pol-
itical movement or impulse: a sovereign auth-
ority must ensure the truth of the discourse.
The hierarchical and archi-aristocratic political
model is not always active in Blanchot’s work,
but it is so at times, especially when he began
addressing the question of “community,”
always affirming a “communism” (which he
was more or less forced to confess “officially,”
so to speak, by his time – and by Mascolo in par-
ticular), which he immediately subjected to the
condition of being neither communitarian nor
common in general (it is here, perhaps, in the
“common,” in a repulsion for the common,
that the deep impulse is nested). The fragility
of Blanchot’s thinking lies in this rejection of
the common, the vulgar, and at the same time
in what is given only commonly, banally, effa-
cing itself in giving itself – not, however, to
transfigure itself (like the woman-Christ in
The Unavowable Community), but simply to
confess itself in its poverty or even in its
common indigence.
Leslie Hill argues that the title “The Unavow-
able Community” is borrowed from Bataille. He
does not give a reference, nor do I have one to
provide. But the “avowal” is so present in
Bataille – in a way, it is even essential – that I
can well imagine that he spoke of an “unavow-
able community” – thereby indicating what
should be confessed: both the obscenity and
the non-knowledge inherent in the communi-
cation of the intimate. I won’t elaborate any
further: that alone should suffice to indicate
the considerable difference that then opens up
between Bataille and Blanchot. It could be sum-
marised as follows: the unavowable in Bataille is
confessed humbly, even miserably and as if
dying; in Blanchot, it slips a revelation about
its secret, which is a kind of resurrection.
I also thank Leslie Hill for reminding me that
I had mentioned The Unavowable Community
in my Inoperative Community in 1986. I had
forgotten about that, otherwise I would of
course have mentioned it in 2014. Leslie says
that, from one day to the next, I contradict
the fragility of thinking
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myself. This is only partly true because what I
said about Blanchot’s book in 1986 was so
vague and undeveloped that not much can be
drawn from it. Instead, one should be surprised
by this lack of precision and rather light and
carefree way of treating the book with which
Blanchot responded to my initial text. It is
then my turn to confess: this indigent passage
bears witness to the fact that in 1986 I still
hadn’t understood a thing of Blanchot’s book
(and that no one allowed me to understand it
– everyone had remained mute, as I pointed
out in 2014). I had only perceived a refusal
and recoil from me that remained poorly deter-
mined. I didn’t know what to do with it and
resolved, out of perplexity and respect for Blan-
chot’s authority, to do what is known as “going
down a tangent.” So I said nothing, but it is not
surprising that with time and Blanchot’s death
my perplexity has matured, my respect shifted
(not been lost!) and I have come to understand
what I can now only confirm
about The Unavowable
Community.
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notes
1 Jean-Luc Nancy, Demande: littérature et philoso-
phie (Paris: Galilée, 2015); Expectation: Philosophy,
Literature, trans. Robert Bononno, with an intro-
duction by Jean-Michel Rabaté (New York:
Fordham UP, 2018). While the French edition
comprises a total of thirty-three texts of diverse
genres from different periods, its English counter-
part contains only twenty-eight, to which it adds
an introduction by Jean-Michel Rabaté. A coda,
according to the dictionary, is “a passage of
more or less independent character introduced
after the completion of the essential parts of a
movement, so as to form a more definite and sat-
isfactory conclusion.”
2 For a detailed account of the dispute between
Nancy and Blanchot on the subject of “commu-
nity,” literature, religion, and politics, see Hill.
3 See Blanchot, La Communauté inavouable 12–13;
The Unavowable Community 3–4. On the frequently
misunderstood and widely misrepresented motif
of the “unavowable” in Blanchot, see Hill 103–16.
4 Robert Bononno’s over-literal English version
uses an unconvincing unidiomatic present tense
here: “‘One day the gods withdraw… ’”
5 Nancy’s original text has “le corps divin.”
6 For the passage to which Nancy refers, see
Schelling, Ausgewählte Schriften V: 205–06; Histori-
cal-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology
136 and 187ne.
7 On this prior history of the term “unavowable,”
and for the precise reference to the source of the
double quotation in Blanchot’s title, see Hill 103–16.
8 It should be emphasised here that there is no
truth in the much repeated but unsubstantiated
allegation that Blanchot before 1940 was sympath-
etic to “French fascism” (or any other kind of
fascism).
9 Somewhat regrettably, in translating the second
of these titles as “The Neutral, Neutralization of
the Neutral,” Robert Bononno follows the estab-
lished but misleading convention of rendering
Blanchot’s “neutre” or “neuter,”which is primarily
a linguistic or syntactical category, with the predo-
minantly political term “neutral,” one of the prime
meanings of which, according to the OED, is
“taking neither side in a dispute, disagreement,
or difference of opinions; not inclining toward
either party, view, etc.; assisting neither of two
contending parties or persons.” It should
however be emphasised that the “neuter” in Blan-
chot never corresponds to such non-partisan
equanimity between extremes.
10 Several other “literary” essays not included in
Demandemay be found in the English translation in
Jean-Luc Nancy, Multiple Arts.
11 As Nancy points out, unlike some of the sur-
rounding material, the sentence recurs unchanged
in Blanchot, Thomas l’Obscur, nouvelle version 42.
For Nancy’s citation and commentary, see
Demande 255; Expectation 179. According to ety-
mology, “ressusciter,” as commonly used in
French translations of Matthew 28.6, means: to
“reanimate” or “restore to life.”
hill
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12 See Hill 193–208.
13 For the essay on which Nancy is drawing, see
Blanchot, L’Espace littéraire 121–66; The Space of
Literature 120–59. It is a curious feature of
Nancy’s reading of Blanchot (also in evidence in
La Communauté désavouée) that he seems unwilling
to distinguish between Blanchot’s own thinking as
a writer and his observations regarding the works
of others.
14 See Blanchot, L’Entretien infini 515–27; The Infi-
nite Conversation 351–59.
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